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Abstract 
Hypothetical bias is a persistent problem in stated preference studies. We propose and test a 
method for reducing hypothetical bias based on the cognitive dissonance literature in social 
psychology. A central element of this literature is that people prefer not to take inconsistent 
stands and will change their attitudes and behavior to make them consistent. We find that 
participants in a stated preference willingness-to-pay study, when told that a nonhypothetical 
study of similar goods would follow, state significantly lower willingness to pay than 
participants not so informed. In other words, participants adjust their stated willingness to pay to 
avoid cognitive dissonance from taking inconsistent stands on their willingness to pay for the 
good being offered. 
 
Keywords: apples; cognitive consistency; hypothetical bias; instrument calibration; willingness 
to pay. 
 
JEL classification: C91; Q13; Q51 
1. Introduction 
 
The theory of cognitive dissonance proposed by Leon Festinger is one of the most influential and 
extensively studied theories in social psychology (Aronson et al., 2007, pp. 159–89). In the 
seminal contribution A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), Festinger defines cognitive 
dissonance as an uncomfortable feeling caused by simultaneously holding two contradictory 
cognitions. These cognitions may be attitudes and beliefs or awareness of one’s own behavior. 
Festinger argues that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance by changing their 
attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors.1 Subsequent research has shown that the dissonance is strongest 
when people behave in ways that threaten their self-image (Aronson, 1969). Building on this 
literature, Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter (2008) argue that people who want to see 
themselves as rational and thoughtful, as well as honest and trustworthy, have a motivational 
drive to try to give consistent responses to a series of questions. In this paper, we propose 
utilizing this motivational drive to reduce the well-known hypothetical bias in valuation studies. 
Hypothetical bias is a persistent problem in stated preference studies. It arises when 
respondents are more willing to spend their money when asked nonconsequential survey 
questions than when they respond to consequential questions about valuation or willingness to 
pay (WTP), i.e., questions resulting in the payment of real money. This means that survey-based 
valuation studies usually yield higher WTP estimates than valuation studies using 
nonhypothetical methods with real economic consequences. For meta studies on hypothetical 
bias, see List and Gallet (2001) and Murphy et al. (2005). 
                                                 
1 Cognitive dissonance is often compared with hunger and thirst: discomfort motivates us to eat 
or drink (see, for example, Aronson et al., 2007, p. 160). 
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Several instrumental calibration methods have been suggested to correct for hypothetical 
bias. Of these, cheap talk and certainty scale calibration have received the most attention 
(Harrison, 2006). Cheap talk attempts to eliminate hypothetical bias through explicit discussion 
of the problem. A script in which the hypothetical bias problem is described is presented by the 
interviewer or attached to the valuation survey, and the respondents are asked to bear this in 
mind and answer as if they were in a real situation. Cummings and Taylor (1999), who first 
presented cheap talk as a method to alleviate hypothetical bias, concluded that the cheap talk 
design was successful in eliciting responses to hypothetical valuation questions that were 
indistinguishable from responses to valuation questions involving actual payment. However, 
later research shows mixed results for the ability of cheap talk to alleviate hypothetical bias (List, 
2001; Murphy et al., 2005; Blumenschein et al., 2008). 
Certainty scale calibration is an ex post technique used to correct for hypothetical bias in 
dichotomous choice questions (Blumenschein et al., 2008). In certainty scale calibration, the 
WTP question is followed by a question that asks how sure respondents are about their response 
to the valuation question. The follow up certainty questions typically take one of two forms: 
definitely sure/probably sure (Blumenschein et al., 2008) or a 10-point scale with 10 as very 
certain (Champ et al., 1997). In the estimation of WTP, only ‘Yes’ responses followed by 
definitely sure or at least 8 on a 10-point certainty scale (Champ et al., 1997) are included as 
valid yes answers. However, as noted by Murphy and Stevens (2004), any method that reduces 
the number of valid yes responses will reduce WTP in dichotomous choice studies. Further, the 
empirical results for what should count as a valid yes differ from study to study, and finally, yet 
importantly, there is no theoretical underpinning for the method. It should also be noted that the 
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certainty scale calibration is not easily used with valuation formats other than dichotomous 
choice questions. 
In this paper, we propose and test a new type of instrument calibration method based on 
cognitive dissonance theory. We refer to our method as real talk. Real talk is to inform 
participants in a hypothetical valuation study that a nonhypothetical valuation study with similar 
but not necessarily identical goods will be conducted after the hypothetical study. In contrast to 
the certainty scale calibration, the real talk method is not limited by the question format, as most 
valuation question formats can be made nonhypothetical. Vickrey (1961) auctions and the 
Becker, DeGrooth and Marschack (1964) mechanism are examples of open-ended 
nonhypothetical valuation questions, while Lusk and Schroeder (2004) and Alfnes et al. (2006) 
are examples of nonhypothetical choice experiments. The real talk method, on the other hand, is 
limited to goods that the participants believe can be included in a nonhypothetical study. These 
include, for example, private goods, like the apples in this analysis, or public good donations, 
such as those described by Veisten and Navrud (2006) and Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 
(2008). 
So how does the real talk method work? Let us assume that an open-ended hypothetical 
valuation question is followed by an incentive-compatible nonhypothetical valuation question, 
and that the participants are informed about this at the beginning of the study, namely, that the 
real talk method is to be applied. If the participants wish to answer the hypothetical and 
nonhypothetical valuation questions consistently, they have three possible strategies. They could 
answer the hypothetical valuation question as if it were a nonhypothetical valuation question; 
they could answer the nonhypothetical valuation question as if it were a hypothetical valuation 
question; or they could choose something in between. The latter two strategies come at the cost 
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of potentially having to buy the product in the nonhypothetical valuation question at a price that 
is higher than the value they attach to the product. Therefore, if the participants wish to avoid 
cognitive dissonance from inconsistent answers, the weakly dominant strategy is to answer the 
hypothetical valuation question as if it were nonhypothetical. 
In the real talk design, we attempt to turn the arguably major weaknesses of within-
subject design, that the results of the various parts of the study may be confounded, into 
something positive. For example, this weakness is the basis of Harrison’s (2006) critique of 
Carlsson and Martinsson’s (2001) test of hypothetical bias in choice experiments.  
In a test of hypothetical bias in choice experiments, Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 
(2008) conducted both within-subject and between-subject tests, with the subjects split into two 
groups. In the first group, respondents first took part in a stated choice experiment, and 
subsequently in a nonhypothetical choice experiment with real economic consequences. 
However, contrary to real talk design, the subjects were not told that they were to face real 
money choices immediately after completing the hypothetical choices. In the second group, the 
participants only took part in the nonhypothetical choice experiment. Comparing the bids given 
by the two groups, they found the largest WTP estimates were in the hypothetical choice 
experiment, which is consistent with the literature on hypothetical bias. Second largest were the 
WTP estimates from the nonhypothetical choice experiment conducted after the hypothetical 
experiment; smallest were the WTP estimates from the group that took part only in the 
nonhypothetical choice experiment. Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter (2008, p. 6) argue that the 
difference in WTP estimates between the real after-hypothetical treatment and the real-direct 
treatment is “expected due to the importance of maintaining cognitive consistency.” This shows 
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that respondents are willing to change their bids and, in this case, even risk a potential economic 
loss to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
The design used by Veisten and Navrud (2006) in a contingent valuation study for the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Forest Fund is one that comes closest to what we propose. Veisten 
and Navrud found a significant reduction in the level of yea-saying in a dichotomous choice 
question when the respondents received an invoice for actual payment together with the 
contingent valuation survey. This is a promising result with respect to the effect of telling the 
respondents that a nonhypothetical question will follow the hypothetical valuation question. The 
rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the market experiment and the 
econometric models used in the analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Market Experiment 
 
The purpose of the market experiment was twofold. First, we wished to investigate the impact of 
cosmetic product damage on consumer WTP for organic and conventional apples. The results of 
this investigation are presented in Yue et al. (in press). Second, we wanted to investigate the 
effect of the real talk method. The results of the latter investigation are presented in the current 
paper. 
The experiment was conducted on the campus of a large U.S. Midwestern university in 
February 2005. Upon arrival, participants were given a folder with U.S.$20, a consent document, 
and a questionnaire. They were told that the money was now theirs, and were asked to complete 
the consent document and the questionnaire. We subsequently conducted an open-ended WTP 
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study phrased as a hypothetical auction in which the alternatives were presented with pictures, 
followed by a nonhypothetical auction with real products. 
 
2.1 Sample 
Participants were recruited by e-mail and advertisements in newsletters at the university campus. 
The e-mail recruitment of participants went to faculty and staff through college-level and 
university unit solicitations in order to assure nonstudent participation. See Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics of the sample. We used Fisher’s exact test to see if there was a relationship 
between the treatments and the socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects. The results suggest 
that there was no statistically significant relationship between treatment and gender (p = 0.97), 
treatment and income (p = 0.88), treatment and education (p = 0.46), or treatment and association 
with the university (p = 0.47), while the relationship between treatment and age (p = 0.06) was 
marginally insignificant. 
 
2.2 Products 
The products used were 3-pound bags of golden delicious apples obtained from commercial 
sources and university farm orchards. Prior to the experiment, the apples were sorted according 
to their production method (conventional and organic) and appearance (level of surface blotches 
caused by sooty blotch fungi). The four appearance categories included SpotA, SpotB, SpotC, 
and SpotD with surface blotches, or spots, ranging from SpotA as apples with no spots to SpotD 
as apples about one-tenth covered with spots. The sorted apples were packed into clear bags for 
easy inspection. In the hypothetical auctions, the apples were replaced with pictures of apples. 
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2.3 Elicitation of value 
We used the full-bidding approach (Lusk and Shogren, 2007) with a uniform-price sealed-bid 
auction. The participants simultaneously bid on 12 alternatives. The winners are the n highest 
bidders and the price equals the (n + 1) highest bid. Vickrey (1961) showed that in uniform-price 
sealed-bid auctions with single unit buyers and the price determined by the highest rejected 
price, it is a weakly dominant strategy for people to bid their WTP for products with independent 
private values. Subjects have an incentive to reveal their private preferences truthfully because 
the auction separates what they say from what they pay. Underbidding participants risk forgoing 
profitable purchases, whereas overbidding participants risk unprofitable purchases. 
The pictures of apples and the apples were presented on a large table and the participants 
walked around the table and placed their bids as they considered each alternative. After the 
auction, each participant randomly drew his or her exclusive binding alternative. The drawing 
was done without replacement, so each participant could draw a unique alternative as his or her 
binding alternative. For this to be possible, the number of alternatives had to be greater than or 
equal to the number of participants in each session. The price of an alternative was equal to the 
fourth-highest bid for that alternative. If the participants had bid higher than the price for their 
binding alternative, they were asked to buy the alternative. The apples they evaluated were the 
same apples they would purchase. For a thorough introduction to the use of experimental 
auctions to value products and product attributes, see the book by Lusk and Shogren (2007).  
 
2.4 Treatments 
The eight sessions were divided into four treatments: No Talk (NT), Cheap Talk (CT), Real Talk 
(RT), and Real Auction (RA). The four treatments included 18, 18, 20, and 22 participants, 
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respectively. In three of the four treatments (NT, CT, and RT), we first conducted a hypothetical 
auction in which the apples were represented by pictures. A hypothetical auction is in fact an 
ordinary open-ended contingent valuation study phrased as an auction. We specified to 
participants that no one would buy any apples because of the auction’s hypothetical nature. After 
the hypothetical auctions in the NT, CT, and RT treatments, we replaced the pictures with apples 
and ran a second auction with a nonhypothetical fourth-price auction. 
In the NT treatment, we did not include any instrument calibration. The monitor simply 
directed the participants to “please, try to behave in the hypothetical auctions as if it were a real 
auction.” In the CT treatment, the monitor used a 493-word-long cheap talk script adopted from 
List (2001). At this point, participants in the NT and CT treatment were not aware that we had 
apples in the room next door. In the RT treatment, the monitor said, “Before you start, I want to 
inform you that right after the hypothetical auctions we will conduct a similar series of real 
auctions with real apples. We have apples similar to what you will see in the pictures and we will 
repeat the whole procedure with real apples. At the end of the real auction, we will sell apples to 
the participants that have bid higher than the price in their binding real auction. Try to behave 
in the hypothetical auctions as if you were a part of the real auctions.” In the fourth treatment, 
the RA treatment, we did not run a hypothetical auction. Instead, we ran two trials with a real 
auction. To avoid income and substitution effects in the RA treatment, we randomly drew which 
of the two auction trials were binding before drawing the individual binding products. Please see 
Table 2 for details of the four treatments. 
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 2.5 Statistical models 
Some of the apple bags deviated slightly from 3 pounds (1,361 grams). To correct for the effect 
of small variations in weight on participants’ bids, we estimated a nonlinear regression model 
that relates the individual bids to the weight and quality of the apples: 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5(1 * )( * * * * * )ni i i i i i i niBid weightdeviation SpotA SpotB SpotC SpotD Orgθ β β β β β= + + + + + +ε
  
(1) 
 
where niBid  is individual n’s bid on alternative i, weightdeviationi is the weight of alternative i in 
grams expressed as a ratio of the 3 pound (1,361 gram) weight, and θ  is the marginal valuation 
of apples relative to the valuation of the first 3 pounds. If θ  = 0, then the participant places no 
value on the weight deviation, i.e., they bid as if all bags are exactly 3 pounds. If θ  = 1, then the 
consumer places the same value on the marginal apple as the average apple, i.e., they bid 10 
percent more for a bag of apples that weighs 1.1 × 1,361 = 1,497 grams than a bag of apples of 
similar quality that weighs 1,361 grams. SpotAi, SpotBi, SpotCi, SpotDi, and Orgi are dummies 
that respectively equal one if alternative i is SpotA, SpotB, SpotC, SpotD, and organic, and zero 
otherwise; and 1β  to 5β are the WTP values associated with 3 pounds of apples with the 
respective qualities. 
Taking the relative valuation of the marginal apples into account, we calculate 
participants’ WTP for 3 pounds of apples as 
 
n ( )ˆ/ 1 *ni ni iWTP Bid weightdeviationθ= +        (2) 
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where θˆ  is the marginal valuation estimated in equation (1). 
We estimate a nonlinear calibration function that relates the difference in WTP between 
the hypothetical and nonhypothetical auction rounds to the treatment effects, an organic dummy, 
and the socio-demographic effects. The treatment effects are expressed as a second-degree 
polynomial of the WTP in the nonhypothetical auction. The socio-demographic variables provide 
statistical controls for the differences in the sample distribution, although these differences were 
not found to be significant (as discussed earlier). As the function is estimated with a relatively 
small sample and includes socio-demographic variables, we do not include any fixed or random 
effects: 
 
( )
( )
2 3
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 1 * * *
* 2 * 2 * * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0
ni ni n n
ni ni i n n n n ni
WTP WTP CT RT
WTP WTP Org Age Gen Inc Edu
α α
β β β β β β β β ε
− = + +
+ + + + + + + +
(3) 
 
where  WTP1ni is the WTP of individual n for alternative i in the first round, WTP2ni is his or her 
WTP in the second round; CTn and RTn are dummies that are equal to one if the respondent was 
included in the CT and RT treatment, respectively, and zero otherwise; 2α  and 3α  are treatment-
specific parameters; 0β , 1β  and 2β  are parameters in the second-degree polynomial; Orgi is a 
dummy variable equal to one if alternative i is organic, and zero otherwise; 3β  is a measure of 
whether there is a difference between conventional and organic apples; Age0n, Gen0n, Inc0n, and 
Edu0n are normalized socio-demographic variables for age, gender, income, and education with a 
zero mean and a standard deviation of one; and 4β  through 7β  are the corresponding 
parameters. If there were no treatment effects, the hypothetical bias would be the same for all 
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three treatments, and so 2α  and 3α  would equal zero. If the hypothetical bias is the same for the 
organic and conventional apples, 3β  equals zero. If there is no hypothetical bias, then 0β  
through 3β  equals zero. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Table 3 presents the results of the nonlinear regression in Equation (1) on how any weight 
deviations affect the bids.2 The bids do not fully account for the variation in weight, and the 
weight deviation was only 46 percent of the average value of the apples in the first 3 pounds. We 
use Equation (2) to estimate the WTP for 3 pounds of apples, based on the bids and the marginal 
valuation of the apples. Table 4 presents the weight-corrected WTP for 3 pounds of conventional 
and organic apples with various degrees of cosmetic damage. 
 
3.1 Differences among the auctions 
We conduct six nonparametric tests of differences between the auctions. In all six tests, we 
include the six alternatives included in all auctions (organic SpotA, conventional SpotA, Organic 
SpotB, conventional SpotB, conventional SpotC, and conventional SpotD). In the first three tests 
we test for differences in WTP, and in the last three tests we test for differences in marginal 
WTP. The marginal WTP is the difference in WTP between two alternatives, calculated so that 
on average the marginal WTP is positive. Because we include six alternatives, there are 15 
                                                 
2 A participant with only half of the first round pairwise rankings in the expected order and bids 
on the organic SpotC and SpotD more than ten times higher than the average bid was excluded 
from the remaining analysis. 
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marginal WTP estimates ( ) for each participant calculated from each of the 
two auction rounds. Since rational consumers would bid in an auction so that they get at least the 
same surplus as if they bought a product in the same product category in the market, the WTP in 
experimental auctions are limited by the prices in the outside market (Alfnes, in press). However, 
close substitutes are affected the same way, and bid differences and marginal WTP are therefore 
the preferred WTP measure in most studies. In what follows, we conduct tests on both bids and 
bid differences. All tests are conducted using SAS. 
2
6C 6* 5 / 2 1= = 5
First, we use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to see if the WTP is the same in the first and 
second rounds of the auctions. The average WTP for the six alternatives in rounds 1 and 2 were 
1.94 and 1.16 in the NT treatment, 2.67 and 1.60 in the CT treatment, 1.95 and 1.33 in the RT 
treatment, and 1.45 and 1.39 in the RA treatment. For all of the hypothetical treatments, we 
reject equal WTP in the first and second round of the auction with p-value = 0.00 for each of the 
treatments. For the RA treatment, we do not reject equal WTP in the first and second rounds of 
the auctions, as p-value = 0.86. It is therefore likely that the change in WTP from the first to the 
second rounds of the auctions in the NT, CT, and RT treatments are because the first round is 
hypothetical while the second round is not. It is worth noting that the first rounds of the auctions 
in the three hypothetical treatments are hypothetical in two senses: first, no real economic 
incentive, and second, no real products (i.e., product pictures only). 
Second, we use a Mann–Whitney test to see if the first round WTP is the same for all four 
treatments. We reject the null hypotheses of equal WTP in the first round for NT and CT (p-
value = 0.00), NT and RA (p-value = 0.01), CT and RT (p-value = 0.00), RT and RA (p-value = 
0.01), and CT and RA (p-value = 0.00), but not for NT and RT (p-value = 0.64). The CT 
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treatment reports a significantly higher WTP than the other two hypothetical treatments, while 
the RA treatment reports a significantly lower WTP than any of the hypothetical treatments. 
Third, we use a Mann–Whitney test to find if the change in WTP between the first and 
second rounds of the auctions is the same for all four treatments. The average changes in WTP 
between the first and second rounds of auctions were 0.78, 1.07, 0.62, and 0.07 for the NT, CT, 
RT, and RA treatments, respectively. We reject the hypothesis that the change in WTP between 
the first and second auction rounds is independent of treatment. The difference between the two 
rounds of auctions is significantly lower in the RA treatment than in the NT (p-value = 0.00), CT 
(p-value = 0.00), and RT (p-value = 0.00). Furthermore, the difference between the two auction 
rounds is significantly lower in the RT treatment than in the CT treatment (p-value = 0.00), and 
lower (but not significantly) in the RT treatment compared with the NT treatment (p-value = 
0.26). However, there is no evidence of a cheap talk effect, and in fact the difference in valuation 
between the first and second rounds of auctions is smaller, but not statistically significant, in the 
NT treatment than in the CT treatment (p-value = 0.16). 
Fourth, we use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to see if the marginal WTP is the same in the 
first and second rounds of the auctions. The marginal WTP is the difference in WTP between 
two alternatives, calculated so that on average the marginal WTP is positive. Because we include 
six alternatives, there are 15 marginal WTP estimates for each participant calculated from each 
of the two rounds. The average marginal WTP in the first and second rounds was 1.30 and 0.89, 
1.32 and 0.78, 0.79 and 0.59, and 0.79 and 0.61 in the NT, CT, RT, and RA treatments, 
respectively. We reject equal marginal WTP in the first and second rounds of the auctions for all 
four treatments, with p-values of 0.00, 0.00, 0.03, and 0.00, respectively. The marginal WTP 
decreases from the first to the second round for all four treatments. From Table 4, we can see that 
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the spread in valuation from the first to the second rounds of the auctions falls for all of the 
alternatives in the RA treatment. Furthermore, the difference between the highest and lowest 
valued alternatives in the RA treatment falls from US$1.74 to US$1.42. In light of this, the 
rejection of equal marginal WTP for the first and second rounds of the auctions in the RA 
treatment comes as no surprise. 
Fifth, we use a Mann–Whitney test to evaluate whether the first-round marginal WTP is 
the same for all four treatments. We reject equal marginal WTP for NT and RT (p-value = 0.00), 
NT and RA (p-value = 0.00), CT and RT (p-value = 0.00), and CT and RA (p-value = 0.00), but 
not NT and CT (p-value = 0.88), and RT and RA (p-value = 0.83). The levels of the WTP differ 
across the four treatments, and the marginal WTP is higher in the NT and CT treatments than in 
the RA treatment. However, the marginal WTP in the RT treatment is not significantly different 
from the marginal WTP in the RA treatment. 
Sixth, we use a Mann–Whitney test to see if the change in marginal WTP between the 
first and second rounds of the auctions is the same for the four treatments. We reject equal 
change in marginal WTP for NT and RT (p-value = 0.00), NT and RA (p-value = 0.00), RT and 
CT (p-value = 0.00), and CT and RA (p-value = 0.00), but not NT and CT (p-value = 0.37) and 
RT and RA (p-value = 0.59). Once again, we find that the RT treatment is the method that yields 
results that are closest to the RA treatment. 
 
3.2 The effect of the hypothetical auctions on subsequent real auctions 
We conduct two nonparametric tests of the effect of the hypothetical auctions on the following 
real auctions. First, we use a Mann–Whitney test to see if the WTP in the second round of the 
auctions is equal for all four treatments. The average WTP levels for the six alternatives in the 
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second round were 1.16, 1.60, 1.33, and 1.39 for the NT, CT, RT, and RA treatments, 
respectively. We reject the null hypotheses of equal WTP in the second round for NT and CT (p-
value = 0.00), NT and RA (p-value = 0.02), CT and RT (p-value = 0.03), and NT and RT (p-
value = 0.05) (at α = .10), but not RT and RA (p-value = 0.53) and CT and RA (p-value = 0.13). 
Second, we use a Mann–Whitney test to check for differences in marginal WTP between the 
second rounds of auctions for the four treatments. We reject equal marginal WTP for NT and RT 
(p-value = 0.00), NT and RA (p-value = 0.00), CT and RT (p-value = 0.04), and CT and RA (p-
value = 0.04), but not for NT and CT (p-value = 0.14), and RT and RA (p-value = 0.90). Once 
again, we can see that the RT treatment is the hypothetical treatment that has most in common 
with the RA treatment. 
 
3.3 Calibration function 
As second approach to measuring the effect of the RT design, we use a nonlinear least square 
model to estimate a calibration function described in Equation (3), including the treatment 
dummies, a second-degree polynomial of the real WTP, an organic specific dummy, and four 
socio-demographic variables. We reject no hypothetical bias ( )0   0,...,7t i iα β = ∀ =  for all three 
treatments (Wald statistic = 100.48, p-value = 0.00; Wald statistic = 47.29, d.f = 8, p-value = 
0.00; Wald statistic = 144.67, d.f = 8, p-value = 0.00; respectively). We can see from the 
treatment effects shown in Table 5 that there is no significant difference between the NT and CT 
treatments. However, the hypothetical bias is significantly lower in the RT treatment than the 
other two hypothetical treatments (41 and 43 percent, respectively). 
Furthermore, we can see that hypothetical bias is significantly higher for organic apples 
than for conventional apples. This is consistent with earlier studies finding that calibration 
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factors are product specific (List and Shogren, 1998). It is also consistent with the literature on 
social desirability bias: in our context, respondents are trying to project themselves as more 
concerned about the environment than they really are. 3 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose and test an instrumental calibration method that utilizes the premise 
that people like to be consistent in their answers and do not like to pay more than what they think 
a good is worth. We find that the use of real talk, which means informing participants in a stated 
preference study that a nonhypothetical study of similar goods will follow, significantly reduces 
the hypothetical bias in the stated preference study. We find no similar effect for cheap talk. We 
therefore conclude that real talk is a valuable addition to the growing toolbox used to handle the 
hypothetical bias persistently found in stated preference studies.  
Real talk can be used in any valuation study in which respondents can be made to believe 
that a similar product, not necessarily identical, will be offered in a nonhypothetical setting. For 
example, real talk can be used when researchers are evaluating consumer preferences toward 
consumer goods still on the drawing board. The products of interest are first presented in a stated 
preference study using manipulated pictures. Thereafter, similar products from the same product 
category are offered in a non-hypothetical setting. In this case, the consumers do not know 
                                                 
3 Social desirability bias has been found to occur in nearly all types of self-reporting measures 
and across nearly all of the social science literature (Fisher, 1993; King and Bruner, 2000; 
Leggett et al., 2003; Nederhof, 1985). As the socially acceptable response comes at no cost in the 
hypothetical auction, the hypothetical auction is more prone to social desirability bias than the 
nonhypothetical auction. 
16 
 
exactly what will be offered in the second part and must behave in the first part of the study as if 
real products are being offered.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (Mean and Standard deviation) 
 Variable Statistics NT CT  RT RA Total 
 Agea Mean 40.88 40.26 32.65 41.67 39.05 
  St.dev. (10.00) (14.29)  (11.47) (14.25) (13.02) 
 Genderb Mean 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.71 0.68 
  St.dev. (0.49) (0.48)  (0.49) (0.46) (0.47) 
 Educationc Mean 4.82 4.63 5.06 5.10 4.91 
  St.dev. (1.29) (1.50)  (1.25) (1.18) (1.29) 
 Incomed  Mean 46.76 52.11 43.24 39.64 45.30 
  St.dev. (35.16) (34.86)  (33.84) (20.65)  (31.00) 
 Undergraduate studente Mean 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.07 
  St.dev. (0.24) (0.37)  (0.24) (0.00) (0.25) 
 Graduate studente Mean 0.24 0.21 0.53 0.43 0.35 
  St.dev.  (0.44) (0.42)  (0.51) (0.51) (0.48) 
 Facultye Mean 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.08 
  St.dev. (0.24) (0.23)  (0.24) (0.30) (0.50) 
 Staffe Mean 0.53 0.53 0.24 0.43 0.43  
  St.dev. (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.44) (0.51) (0.50) 
a The age question had seven age classes. The midpoints of the age classes are used in the 
estimation. bMale = 0, Female = 1. cLess than high school=0; Some high school or less = 1, High 
school diploma = 2, Some college = 3, College Diploma = 4, Some graduate school = 5, 
Graduate degree = 6. d In USD 1000. The income question had eight income classes. The 
midpoints of the income classes are used in the estimation. eNo = 0,Yes = 1. 
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Table 2. Overview of the Four Treatments 
 No Talk (NT) Cheap Talk (CT) Real Talk (RT) Real Auction (RA)
First 
auction  
Hypothetical 
auction with NT 
Hypothetical 
auction with CT 
Hypothetical 
auction with RT 
Real auction 
Second 
auction  
Real auction Real auction Real auction Real auction 
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 Table 3. Results of the Weight Correction Model 
  
 Variable      Parameter Std Error p-value  
 
 Weight deviation    0.47       0.28      0.09        
 SpotA           1.88       0.09       0.00        
 SpotB            1.31      0.11       0.00         
 SpotC            0.99       0.12      0.00         
 SpotD            0.57       0.10       0.00         
 Organic            0.25       0.07      0.00         
 
Number of observations 1188 
R-squared  0.18 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 
Note: Estimated with Limdep 8.0.  
 
 
22 
 
Table 4. WTP for 3 Pounds of Applesa 
 Conventional apples Organic apples 
 Mean StD Median N Mean StD Median N 
NoTalk: Picture 
 SpotA 2.41 1.44 2.00 25 3.41 1.59 3.00 26 
 SpotB 2.03 2.22 1.82 25 2.37 1.12 2.00 26 
 SpotC 1.16 0.92 1.00 25 1.52 0.91 1.30 26 
 SpotD 0.31 0.38 0.00 25 0.89 0.97 0.50 26 
NoTalk: Auction 
 SpotA 1.72 1.07   1.68 51 2.14 0.95 1.96 51 
 SpotB 0.76 0.57 0.82 17 1.43 0.87 1.45 51
 SpotC 0.66 0.59 0.78 17  
 SpotD 0.25 0.39  0.00 17 
CheapTalk: Picture  
 SpotA 3.49 2.14 2.60 30 4.03 2.01 3.69 30 
 SpotB 2.65 1.49 2.45 30 3.05 1.87 2.28 30 
 SpotC 1.92 1.21 1.75 30 2.23 1.46 1.90 30 
 SpotD 0.83 0.82 0.91 30 1.30 1.54 0.95 30 
CheapTalk: Auction 
 SpotA 2.30 1.13 2.01 60 2.20 1.01 2.07 60 
 SpotB 1.71 0.59 1.59 20 1.73 1.00 1.71 60 
 SpotC 1.03 0.66 1.11 20  
 SpotD 0.65 0.54 0.73 20 
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RealTalk: Picture  
 SpotA 2.32 1.00 2.10 28 2.92 1.39 2.50 26 
 SpotB 2.13 1.03 1.90 26 2.06 1.04 1.85 28 
 SpotC 1.56 0.89 1.20 26 1.52 0.74 1.50 28 
 SpotD 0.87 0.68 0.95 28 0.97 0.80 3.00 26 
RealTalk: Auction 
 SpotA 1.67 0.61 1.52 54 1.90 0.66 1.86 54 
 SpotB 1.08 0.56 1.19 18 1.62 0.75 1.48 54 
 SpotC 1.12 0.83 0.96 18 
 SpotD 0.59 0.45 0.76 18 
Real Auction: Auction1 
 SpotA 2.02 1.29 1.87 66 2.23 1.37 1.90 66 
 SpotB 1.22 0.96 1.13 22 1.65 1.16 1.47 66 
 SpotC 1.05 1.00 0.76 22 
 SpotD 0.59 0.68 0.37 22 
Real Auction: Auction2 
 SpotA 1.75 0.76 1.88 66 2.00 0.98 1.91 66 
 SpotB 1.33 0.87 1.23 22 1.54 0.89 1.47 66 
 SpotC 1.05 0.83 0.87 22 
 SpotD 0.68 0.67 0.49 22 
a3 pounds = 1361 grams.  
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 Table 5. Estimated Parameters for the Calibration Function 
Variable Parameter Std Error  p-value 
 
Treatment effects 
 CTa           0.23        0.20      0.25    
 RTb           -0.33        0.15      0.03       
General effects  
 Constant 0.87        0.15    0.00 
 WTP2 c            -0.32        0.16       0.05        
 WTP2Sq  d 0.09 0.04 0.01 
 Orge            0.52        0.15      0.00        
 Age0 f           -0.40        0.11      0.00       
 Gen0 f          -0.01        0.07     0.87       
 Inc0 f            0.36       0.11      0.00        
 Edu0 f            -0.05       0.07      0.47      
# Obs  330 
R-squared 0.47 
Adj. R-squared  0.48 
Note: Estimated with Limdep 8.0. 
aCT is the cheap talk treatment. bRT is the real talk treatment. cWTP2 is the willingness to pay 
for 3 pounds of similar apples in the real auction. dWTP2 squared. eOrg is a dummy that is one 
for organic apples, zero otherwise. fNormalized variables: Age0=(Age-mean(Age))/standard 
deviation(Age). Similarly for Gen0, Inc0 and Edu0.  
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Appendix 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
There were four experimental treatments in this experiment. The effect of these treatments is 
investigated in another paper. In this paper the effect of the treatments is captured by the random 
element in the picture parameter. 
 
 
Treatment 1 
 
Treatment 2 
 
Treatment 3 
 
Treatment 4 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction 
Instruction A Instruction A Instruction A Instruction A 
Instruction B1 Instruction B2 Instruction B3 Instruction B4 
Instruction C1 Instruction C1 Instruction C1 Instruction C4 
Instruction D1 Instruction D1 Instruction D1 Instruction D4 
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Treatment 1,2,3,4: Introduction (Presented by the monitor) 
Hi, my name is ………. and I am going to run this experiment. I have a script that I will follow 
closely and some parts of the instructions I will read directly from the script.  
First, I would like to thank you all for agreeing to participate in today’s experiment on 
market decision making. The purpose of the experiment is to study consumers’ willingness to 
pay for various types of apples and consumers’ decision making in experimental auction 
markets. The whole session will last approximately one hour.  
In front of you there is a folder with papers and an envelope. Inside the envelope, you 
will find 20 dollars as thanks for participating and an ID number. You will use this ID number to 
identify yourself during this research session. Please make sure that all the papers you hand in 
have your ID number on them.  
 Before we begin, I want to emphasize that your participation in this session is completely 
voluntary. If you do not wish to participate in the experiment, please say so at any time. Non-
participants will not be penalized in any way. I want to assure you that the information you 
provide will be kept strictly confidential and used only for the purposes of this research. If you 
consent to participate in the experiment, please sign the consent form and hand it in to one of us. 
You have the general instructions for the market experiment in your folder. Please read 
the instructions. After you have read the instructions, I will summarize them and give some 
additional information about today’s session.  
 
Importantly, from this point forward, I ask that there be no talking among participants. Failure to 
comply with these instructions will result in disqualification from the experiment.  
Are there any questions before we begin? 
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Treatment 1,2,3,4:  Instructions A  (Read by the participants) 
In this market experiment, we are going to use experimental auctions. We will first go through 
the general features of the auctions and then give more details about how we are going to 
implement the auctions in this session.  
 The auctions we are using are fourth-price auctions. In a fourth-price auction each 
participant gives one written bid, and the price of the product is determined by the fourth-highest 
bid.  
 We will ask you to submit bids on 12 products. After we have collected all the bids, each 
of you will randomly draw a unique number between 1 and 12. The numbers you draw will 
determine which one of the 12 product auctions is binding for each of you. Your bids in the other 
11 auctions are not binding. It is also possible that you will draw a zero. In that case, none of the 
12 auctions will be binding for you. We will sort through all the bids to find the fourth-highest 
bid in each auction and this will be the price. The price of all 12 products will be posted on the 
board. If you bid higher than the price in your binding auction you will be required to buy the 
product with the price paid being the auction price.  
 The products we are offering in this experimental market are 3-pound bags of Golden 
Delicious apples. We have sorted the apples based on production method and appearance. The 
apples in each bag are of the same quality.  
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Example 
Let us first look at an example of how a fourth-price auction works. We assume that participant 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 have submitted the bids 90, 80, 70, 60, and 50, respectively, for a product. Also, 
we assume that these five bids are the five highest bids for the product. The fourth-highest bid is 
60 and this will be the price. See Figure 1. If participant 1, 2 or 3 were to draw this auction as 
their binding auction they would be required to buy the product at a price equal to the fourth 
highest bid (60 in this example). If participant 4 or 5 were to draw this auction as their binding 
auction they would not be allowed to buy this product, since their bids are equal or lower than 
the price.  
 
 
Figure 1  
  
Participant 
 
Bid 
 
 1 90  
Potential buyers 2 80  
 3 70  
 4 60 Price 
 5 50  
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What should you do? 
In a fourth-price auction, it is in the participant’s own interest to bid the highest amount he or she 
is willing to pay for each of the products. Let’s assume that the bids in Figure 1 represent the 
highest amounts that the participants 1 to 5 are willing to pay for this product. 
What happens if participant 1 submits a higher bid? His or her bid is still above 60, and 
participant 1 is still a potential buyer and the price is still 60. What happens if participant 1 tries 
to buy the product at a lower price by submitting a lower bid? If his or her bid is above 60, 
participant 1 is still a potential buyer and the price is still 60. If the bid is below or equal to 60, 
then participant 1 is no longer a potential buyer and is not allowed to buy the product even 
though the price is below what he or she would be willing to pay for the product. The same 
argument applies for participant 2 and 3.  
What happens if participant 4 tries to buy the product by submitting a lower bid? His or 
her bid is still below 60, and participant 4 is still not a potential buyer. What happens if 
participant 4 tries to buy the product by submitting a higher bid? If the bid is below or equal to 
70, participant 4 is still not a potential buyer. If the bid is above 70, participant 4 is a potential 
buyer. However, the price is now 70 and above what the product is worth to him or her. The 
same argument applies for participant 5 and all other participants with a valuation below the 
price. 
 
Hence, none of the participants can do better than bidding the highest amount he or she is 
willing to pay for the product. 
30 
 
Summary Instructions  
1) You are to carefully examine each alternative and write the highest amount that you 
are willing to pay for each of the 12 alternatives on the bidding sheet.  
2) After we collect all bids, each of you will draw a unique number between 1 and 12 
from a deck of cards. The number you draw will determine which one of the 12 
auctions will be binding for you. Your bids in the other 11 auctions are not binding. It 
is also possible that you will draw a zero. In that case, none of the 12 auctions will be 
binding for you. 
3) The price in each auction is set equal to the fourth-highest bid in that auction. The 
prices will be posted on the board after the auction. 
4) If you have bid higher than the price in your binding auction you will be required to 
buy the apples. 
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Treatment 1: Instructions B1 (Presented by the monitor)  
Each session of this experiment will be unique. In this session we are going to use hypothetical 
auctions. That means that the apples will be represented by pictures and at the end of the 
auction no one will actually buy any apples. Before we took the pictures we sorted the apples 
based on production method and appearance. You can assume that all the apples in each 
picture are of the same quality. You should carefully examine the apples before you make your 
bids. We will go through the whole auction procedure as described above, but after we have 
posted the prices no one will actually buy any apples.  
 
Please, try to behave in the hypothetical auctions as if they were real auctions.  
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Treatment 2: Instructions B2 (Presented by the monitor)  
Each session of this experiment will be unique. In this session we are going to use hypothetical 
auctions. That means that the apples will be represented by pictures and at the end of the auction 
no one will actually buy any apples. Before we took the pictures we sorted the apples based on 
production method and appearance. You can assume that all the apples in each picture are of the 
same quality. You should carefully examine the apples before you make your bids. We will go 
through the whole auction procedure as described above, but after we have posted the prices no 
one will actually buy any apples.  
 
Real Talk 
Before you start, I want to inform you that right after the hypothetical auctions we will conduct a 
similar series of real auctions with real apples. We have similar apples as you will see on the 
pictures and we will repeat the whole procedure with real apples. At the end of the real auction, 
we will sell apples to the participants that have bid higher than the price in their binding real 
auction. Try to behave in the hypothetical auctions as if they were a part of the real auctions.  
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Treatment 3: Instructions B3 (Presented by the monitor)  
Each session of this experiment will be unique. In this session we are going to use hypothetical 
auctions. That means that the apples will be represented by pictures and at the end of the auction 
no one will actually buy any apples. Before we took the pictures we sorted the apples based on 
production method and appearance. You can assume that all the apples in each picture are of the 
same quality. You should carefully examine the apples before you make your bids. We will go 
through the whole auction procedure as described above, but after we have posted the prices no 
one will actually buy any apples.  
 
Cheap Talk 
Before you start I want to talk to you about a problem that we have in studies like this one. As I 
told you a minute ago, this is a hypothetical auction - not a real one. No one will actually pay 
money at the end. But, I also ask you to bid as though the result would involve a real cash 
payment. And that’s the problem.  
In most studies of this kind, folks seem to have a hard time doing this. They act 
differently in a hypothetical situation, where they don’t really have to pay money, than they do in 
a real situation, where they really have to pay money. For example, in a recent study, several 
different groups of people bid in an auction. Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it will 
be for you. No one had to pay money if he or she won the auction. The results of this study were 
that on average, across the groups, people overstated their actual willingness-to pay by 150 
percent in the hypothetical auction. That’s quite a difference, isn’t it?   
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We call this “hypothetical bias.” “Hypothetical bias” is the difference that we continually 
see in the way people respond to hypothetical situations as compared to real situations—just like 
the overbidding example presented above.  
How can we get people to think about their choices in a hypothetical situation like they 
think in a real situation, where a person will really have to pay money? How do we get them to 
think about what it means to really dig into their pocket and pay money, if in fact they really 
aren’t going to have to do it?  
Let me tell you why I think that we continually see this hypothetical bias, why people 
behave differently in a hypothetical situation than they do when in a real situation. I think that 
when we behave in a hypothetical situation we place our best guess of what we would really like 
to do. But, when the choice is real, and we would actually have to spend our own money if we 
win, we think a different way: if I spend money on this, that’s money I don’t have to spend on 
other things ... we act in a way that takes into account the limited amount of money we have ... 
This is just my opinion, of course, but it’s what I think may be going on in hypothetical 
situations.  
So, if I were in your shoes, and I was asked to bid for a series of products, I would think 
about how I feel about spending my money this way. When I got ready to bid, I would ask 
myself: if this was a real situation, and I had to pay, am I really willing to pay so much money 
for this product?  
 
Please keep this in mind when making your bids and try to behave in the hypothetical auctions as 
if it were real auctions.  
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Treatment 4: Instruction B4: Real Auction 1 (Presented by monitor) 
Each session of this experiment is unique. In this session we will conduct the auctions twice. 
After we have conducted the second set of auctions, we will randomly draw one of the two trials 
as the binding auctions trial. We have sorted the apples based on production method and 
appearance. The apples in each bag are of the same quality. You should carefully examine the 
apples before you make your bids. But please, don’t lift the bags. 
 
Important notes: 
1) You have the opportunity to buy one bag of apples here today. After we have collected 
all bids, each of you will randomly draw a unique number between 1 and 12. The number 
you draw will determine which one of the 12 auctions that are binding for you. Your bids 
in the other 11 auctions are not binding. It is also possible that you will draw a zero. In 
that case, none of the 12 auctions will be binding for you. 
Under no circumstance will anyone buy more than one bag. 
2) You must pay for any apple you buy. If your bid in your binding auction is higher than 
the price in that auction, you are required to buy the bag of apples at a price that is set by 
the fourth-highest bid for that bag of apples. 
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Treatment 1, 2, and 3:  Instructions C1 Bidding Sheets  (Presented by the monitor)  
 (Show bidding sheet) 
There are 12 alternatives on the table in front of you. Each are 3 pounds of apples. In your folder 
you will find a bidding sheet for the 12 alternatives. You are going to write down your bids for 
each of the 12 alternatives on the bidding sheet. If you are not interested in an alternative at any 
price, you can bid zero.  
 
You can start wherever you want, so please spread around the table. Mark on the bidding sheet 
which alternative you started with and please go clockwise around the table. After you are 
finished you can hand in your bidding sheet to one of us.  
 
Then we will sort through the bids, find the fourth-highest bid for each alternative, post the 
prices and each of you will draw a unique number determining your binding auction.  
 
Remember, this is a hypothetical auction and no one will actually buy any apples in this auction. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin the auction? 
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Treatment 4:  Instructions C4 Bidding Sheets  (Presented by the monitor)  
 (Show bidding sheet) 
There are 12 alternatives on the table in front of you. Each is 3 pounds of apples. In your folder 
you will find a bidding sheet for the 12 alternatives. You are going to write down your bids for 
each of the 12 alternatives on the bidding sheet. If you are not interested in an alternative at any 
price, you can bid zero. 
 
You can start wherever you want, so please spread around the table. Mark on the bidding sheet 
which alternative you started with and please go clockwise around the table. After you have 
finished you can hand in your bidding sheet to one of us. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin the auction? 
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Treatment 1, 2 and 3: Instructions D1 Real Auction (Presented by the monitor)  
We have apples that are similar to those you have seen on the pictures. We will now repeat the 
whole procedure with real apples. As in the hypothetical auction, the apples differ in 
production method and appearance. The placement of the various qualities of apples around 
the table differs from the placement in the hypothetical auction.  
 You should carefully examine the apples before you make your bids. But please, don’t lift 
the bags. At the end, we will sell apples to the participants that have bid higher than the price in 
their binding real auction. What you did in the hypothetical auction will have no effect on the 
outcome of this auction. 
 
Important notes: 
1) You have the opportunity to buy one bag of apples here today. After we have collected 
all bids, each of you will randomly draw a unique number between 1 and 12. The number 
you draw will determine which one of the 12 auctions that are binding for you. Your bids 
in the other 11 auctions are not binding. It is also possible that you will draw a zero. In 
that case, none of the 12 auctions will be binding for you. 
Under no circumstance will anyone buy more than one bag.  
2) You must pay for any apple you buy. If your bid in your binding auction is higher than 
the price in that auction, you are required to buy the bag of apples at a price that is set by 
the fourth-highest bid for that bag of apples. 
Are there any questions before we begin the auction? 
You can start wherever you want, so please spread around the table. 
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Treatment 4: Instructions D4 Second real auction (Presented by the monitor)  
We will now conduct the auctions a second time. After you are finished, we will randomly draw 
one of the two trials as the binding auctions trial. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin the auction? 
You can start wherever you want, so please spread around the table.  
 
 
 
